
THE ECONOMIST, CLEARINGHOUSES AND GLD/TLT
With the bull market and now bear market in gold, I had lost sight (temporarily) of what I am trying to do with GLD/TLT. My thoughts for the last few weeks were all on why was gold so weak. And this is fair enough. But the real issue is why has TLT not been weaker? My thoughts on TLT were reignited when I was reading a Special Report on the treasury market in the Economist. Generally speaking a good report - but one paragraph really exercised me. The writer foolishly believes that central clearing will improve liquidity for treasuries.I have written a letter to the Economist, explaining why this is wrong, which is below, but I doubt it gets published.I have been intrigued by clearinghouses for years now, ever since I read about a Nordic power market central clearinghouse going bankrupt back in 2018. It took some digging to work out what went on, but to cut a long story short - clearinghouse have no ability to price risk, and no incentive to do so. So they basically assume tomorrow will look like today, which creates huge momentum trades. The better something is doing, the more leverage they will supply. And in essence, what happened in Nordic power in 2018, is getting primed to happen in treasuries.You may well say, how can you be sure the treasury market will blow up? Well the good news is we had a dry run in the gilt market already. When Liz Truss shocked the gilt market, it caused UK gilts to diverge radically from other bond markets for a good month or so.And we almost realised a Treasury blow up during the liberation day tariff sell off in 2025.So how do clearinghouses cause illiquidity in gilts and treasuries? Well clearinghouse are owned by profit maximising corporates, and so have a naturally tendency to try and maximise volumes. If you look at the middle chart below, you can see that banks used to be borrowers from repo markets, but are now lenders. This chart is 7 years old, but as we have seen above, hedge fund borrowing would have only increased.Why does this create illiquidity? Well hedge funds buy physical treasuries and then sell futures against them. There is a small arbitrage profit - but with leverage it can be substantial. Pre GFC - you could not use clearinghouses to do this trade, as the cost of initial margin would make this prohibitively expensive. The only way to do it would be to borrow from banks - which is what LTCM did. LTCM was very secretive about how much it had borrowed to do this trade - but once the banks found out the size of the borrowing, they cut lending, positioned themselves the other way, and scalped LTCM.Theoretically, with central clearing, this should not be possible. All trades are done with the central clearinghouse and require initial margin. However, this ignores another change in regulations - compression. Essentially, clearinghouses will look at your trades, and if they think they are similar enough, will allow you to compress the trades, and return initial margin to you. LCH (the main fixed income clearinghouse) used to boast of the amount of compression it did a year. The last number I have is USD 800 trillion in 2019. Treasury cash futures basis trade should qualify for compression.In my view, compression trades make clearinghouses as dangerous as banks pre GFC. It removes the excess margin which kept them safe in 2008, and has a nasty side effect of making the market bifurcated - that is in this case, hedge funds on one side, and banks on the other. The banks know all about this - and have been urging reform - but on deaf ears.Anyway, given the size of the basis trade market, and the relative unattractiveness of US 30 year treasuries, the market looked primed for a big move.If you read this far, then I can tell you what I think will happen, and why I like short TLT so much. At some point, there will be a shock - tariff increase, big increase in fiscal deficit, something. And Treasuries will fall. The clearinghouse will raise margins, and both lenders and borrowers in the repo market will have pay more initial margin. That is BOTH sides of the market will have to put up cash, meaning that BOTH sides of the market suddenly do not have cash, and the market become illiquid, leading to further falls in treasuries. The treasury market will become very illiquid, and traders will be looking for other ways to hedge their position. TLT being and ETF - can provide liquidity - and I see it trading to a big discount to NAV, as all the hedge fund will need to reduce their physical holdings of treasuries. Of course the Fed will be motivated to act, although Kevin Warsh and Scott Bessent have indicated a tendency to want the Fed to do less - there is a chance they let this play out. That is I expect the treasury market to totally freeze up, and TLT will act as grey market for US 30 year treasuries - which will be much lower than it is today. I would also expect US assets to do poorly in this situation. Why is weak gold good for this trade? I owned gold as a hedge against the Federal Reserve not allowing the market to clear properly. If gold is falling because the Fed is reducing liquidity - then the risk of a treasury blow up should be rising substantially. Exciting times. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.russell-clark.com/subscribe













